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Abstract—In recent events, user-privacy has been a main focus 
for  all  technological  and  data-holding  companies,  due  to  the 
global interest in protecting personal information. Regulations 
like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) set firm laws 
and penalties around the handling and misuse of user data. These 
privacy rules apply regardless of the data structure, whether it 
being structured or unstructured. 
In this work, we perform a summary of the available algo- 
rithms for providing privacy in structured data, and analyze the 
popular tools that handle privacy in textual data; namely medical 
data. We found that although these tools provide adequate results 
in terms of de-identifying medical records by removing personal 
identifyers (HIPAA PHI), they fall short in terms of being 
generalizable to satisfy nonmedical fields. In addition, the metrics 
used to measure the performance of these privacy algorithms 
don't take into account the differences in significance that every 
identifier has. 
Finally, we propose the concept of a domain-independent 
adaptable system that learns the significance of terms in a given 
text, in  terms of  person identifiability and  text  utility, and  is 
then able to provide metrics to help find a balance between user 
privacy and data usability. 
Index Terms—privacy, k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, 
NLP, textual data, privacy in text 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATIO N 
The legal right to privacy is a fundamental human right 
recognized in the UN (United Nation) declaration of human 
rights [52]. The unprecedented growth of highly advanced 
technologies – in the last two decades – has imperiled privacy 
significantly. Today, different aspects of human life has been 
digitalized including communication medium, socialization, 
entertainment, purchasing and many others. People adopted 
the  digital  systems  due  to  increasing  efficiency in  day-to- 
day tasks. In some cases the adoption is forced by social 
practices such as the use of social media. Nevertheless, the 
digital transformation created an ample of opportunities for 
various organizations and adversaries to abuse privacy since 
the digital systems enable them to hold information of people 
forever. Organizations such as Google can profile anyone 
without the users being aware of it. The concrete evidence 
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of personal information abuse are the two recent incidents: 
Facebook trail [46] and google testimony [47]. Its not only the 
software vendors, social medias, hardware companies violates 
the privacy as well. As an example, Samsung's smart TVs 
recording audio [51], and the recent events that happened 
unavailing the potential of the giant Chinese tech company 
Huawei using its mobile phone to spy on users, blocking its 
phones from using google services and banning them from the 
US [50]. There are regulations that govern user data handling, 
latest of which is the European's General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) [49] which needs transparency, and user- 
anonymity when performing statistical analysis, and places 
heavy fines on violating parties. 
The task of making the web a safe place for users is a largely 
difficult problem due to the inherently open, nondeterministic 
nature of the Web, and the complex, leakage-prone information 
flow of many Web-based transactions that involve the transfer 
of sensitive, personal information. Despite considerable atten- 
tion, Web privacy continues to pose significant threats and 
challenges. One major step is securing the way companies 
store, share and publish user information, as data regulations 
impose data publication, which if not secured, can be used 
to re-identify the individual owners. Securing stored/published 
data depends on the way data is stored. In the past, information 
was almost strictly stored in the form of structured relational 
databases [44]. Consequently, shared data was in the form 
of structured datasets. Ensuing privacy to these datasets was 
first in the form of deleting the unique identifiers, but then L. 
Sweeney [28] published a research result that proved that users 
can still be identified from their quazi-identifiers, and proposed 
a new methodology known  as  k-anonymity [1].  Following 
K-anonymity, several solutions were proposed including /!- 
diversity [3] and t-closeness [4] that address shortcomings 
discovered in k-anonymity. However, in 2006, Dwork and 
Aaron introduced differential privacy [6] as a solution for 
privacy-preserving data analysis which can be used to provide 
security for both data storage and analysis. 
Recently, the changes in applications, user and infrastructure 
characteristics, mostly of the Web 2.0 domain [53] and cloud 
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platform, led to an exponential growth of the internet and the 
explosion of data sources such as sensors, social media, etc. 
and massive workloads. This kind of data is typically referred 
to as Big Data [7]. This foster the requirement of a new format 
of data storage, known as unstructured data [48] which is 
essentially the central focus of this research. To be specific, the 
textual form of this unstructured data is the key focus of this 
research. Privacy in unstructured text is critically important for 
several reasons yet the most substantial reason is the amount 
of unstructured data generated by companies. More than 80% 
of the data generated in the last ten years are unstructured 
(mostly in textual form). This implies the fact that a massive 
volume of data is recorded in textual form yet the privacy 
in unstructured text, to the best of our knowledge, lack robust 
solutions. We studied several use cases that belong to different 
industrial domains including finance, healthcare, and insurance 
etc. According to our study, banking and healthcare sectors 
generate a huge volume of unstructured text; both of these 
industrial domains are facing several challenge concerning 
privacy of user information - which is the key motivation of 
this research. The need of a privacy mechanism for unstruc- 
tured data confidentiality exceeds expectations, especially for 
textual data in the healthcare sector [8] [9]. A large number of 
researches in this field thrived aiming at providing anonymity 
in text. Many works rose that provide different privacy 
solutions for text, mostly focusing on medical data, governed 
by the regulations placed by the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [36]. Older work used rule-
based approaches, but more recent work is more centered 
around the use of neural networks and deep learning. 
In this paper, we provide a review of the different potential 
methodologies used for user data privacy in structured data 
and unstructured textual data. One of our key objectives in this 
research is to discover the most promising methodologies that 
have been proposed in literature. Therefore, we've reviewed 
the key existing solutions and conducted a deep and wide 
comparative study.  Also,  we  reviewed the  most  prominent 
tools available on the web for natural language processing, 
that can be/are being used for providing privacy in text. In 
our comparative study, we look into the privacy methodologies 
used for structured data, before the governance of the use of 
unstructured data. We also identify the major weaknesses of 
existing approaches for privacy in natural texts. Based on our 
finding we proposed a novel methodology that would address 
these weaknesses. In this paper, we merely presented the 
architecture of our work-in-progress that is aimed at providing 
user anonymity in text. In addition, our proposed solution is 
capable of providing metrics concerning the risk of privacy 
leakage, sensitivity, and usability of a given text document 
containing personal information. 
The remainder of this paper is organized follows. We start 
by discussing privacy methodologies used in structured data 
in Section II. In Section III we discuss privacy methodologies 
and tools used for textual data, and talk about their advantages 
and shortcomings. Then we introduce our approach for privacy 
in text in Section IV, and finally conclude and debate future 
work in Section V. 
 
II.  PRIVACY IN STRUCTURED DATA 
There are two natural models for privacy mechanisms: 
interactive and noninteractive. In the noninteractive setting the 
data collector, a trusted entity, publishes a sanitized version of 
the collected data; the literature uses terms such as anonymiza- 
tion and de-identification. Traditionally, sanitization employs 
techniques such as data perturbation and sub-sampling, as well 
as removing well-known identifiers such as names, birth dates, 
and social security numbers. It may also include releasing 
various types of synopses and statistics. In the interactive 
setting, the data collector, again trusted, provides an interface 
through which users may pose queries about the data, and get 
(possibly noisy) answers. 
Originally, data were published in tabular format, and made 
anonymous by  simply  removing  all  the  explicit  identifiers 
like names and phone numbers. However, in most of these 
cases, the remaining data can be used to re-identify individ- 
uals by linking it to other purposely collected data or by 
looking at unique characteristics in the released data  [28] 
[29] [30]. Combinations of few characteristics often combine 
in populations to uniquely or nearly uniquely identify some 
individuals. Most known study on this is one done by Archie 
et  al.  [29]  in  the  university  of  Texas  where  they  applied 
their own de-anonymization methodology to a dataset 
published by Netflix (Netflix Prize dataset) [25], which 
contained anonymous movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers 
of Netflix, and demonstrated that an adversary who knows 
only little information about an individual subscriber can 
easily identify this subscriber's record in the dataset. A more 
recent work by Narayanan et al. [30] shows a similar context, 
only this time de-anonymizing the Netflix Prize dataset users 
using publicly available Amazon review data [26] [27]. Here, 
[30] were able to uncover more user information like a user's 
full name and shopping habits. 
 
A. Noninteractive Approach 
1) K-Anonymity: k-anonymity [1] is a property of a dataset 
that describes its level of anonymity. Developed in 1998 as a 
means to address the problem of releasing person-specific data 
while preserving the anonymity of the individuals to whom the 
data refers using generalization and suppression techniques. 
A dataset is k-anonymous if every combination of identity- 
revealing characteristics (quazi-identifiers) occurs in at least 
k different rows of the dataset. Table I shows a dataset that 
has been 2-anonymized; note how the attributes ”Age” and 
”Gender” are identical in the top 2 and bottom2 rows. 
2) /!-Diversity:   /!-diversity  [3] was developed in 2006 to 
solve 2 privacy problems found in k-anonymity. First one is 
that an attacker can discover the values of sensitive attributes 
in a k-anonymous dataset when there is little diversity in those 
sensitive attributes. Second is background knowledge attacks. 
To give an example, if there are 100 different men with ages 
above 70 years living in area A who all have allergies to 
peanuts, then I know that Bob, who is 72 years of age, living 
31
ZIP Code Age Salary Disease 
4767* 
4767* 
4767* 
leq 40 
leq 40 
leq 40 
3K 
5K 
9K 
gastric ulcer 
stomach cancer 
pneumonia 
4790* 
4790* 
4790* 
leq 40 
leq 40 
leq 40 
6K 
11K 
8K 
gastritis 
flu 
bronchitis 
 
Nonsensitive Sensitive 
Zip Code Age Nationality Condition 
1305* 
1305* 
1305* 
1305* 
≤ 40 
≤ 40 
≤ 40 
≤ 40 
 Heart Disease Viral Infection 
Cancer Cancer 
1485* 
1485* 
1485* 
1485* 
> 40 
> 40 
> 40 
> 40 
 Cancer Heart Disease 
Viral Infection 
Viral Infection 
 
TABLE I 
2-AN O N Y M O U S DATA S E T 
TABLE III 
DATA S E T W I T H 0 .167-C L O S E N E S S W I T H R E S P E C T TO S A L A RY A N D 
0.278-C L O S E N E S S W I T H R E S P E C T TO DI S E A S E 
Age Gender Score 
[10-12] Male 98 
[10-12] Male 77 
[11-12] Female 97 
[11-12] Female 80 
 
 
TABLE II 
3-DI V E R S E DATA S E T 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in area A,  also has an allergy to peanuts. /!-diversity  aims 
to solve these problems by applying the following principle: 
a generalized quasi-identifier q*-block (equivalence class) is 
/!-diverse if it contains a minimum of ‘/!‘ properly depicted 
values under the sensitive attribute present in these blocks. 
If every q*-block in a dataset is /!-diverse, then the dataset 
meets the /!-diversity  concept. Table II shows an example of 
an /!-diverse (3-diverse) dataset. 
3) t-Closeness:  t-closeness [4] comes as a betterment of /!- 
diversity by decreasing the granularity of the interpreted data. 
Introduced in 2007, where Li et al. [4] showed that /!-diversity 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent attribute disclo- 
sure, and instead provided t-closeness which requires that the 
distribution of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class is 
close to the distribution of a sensitive attribute in the overall 
table. The distance between distributions is measured using 
Earth Movers Distance (EMD). For a categorical attribute, 
EMD is used to measure the distance between the values in 
it according to the minimum level of generalization of these 
values in the domain hierarchy. Table III shows an example of 
a dataset that has 0.167-closeness with respect to Salary and 
0.278-closeness with respect to Disease. 
These methods are not applicable for providing privacy for 
textual data. They were made at a time were structured data 
was the governing method for data storage. 
 
B. Differential Privacy (Interactive Approach) 
Differential privacy was introduced in 2006 by Dwork and 
Aaron [6]. It offers a robust mathematical definition of privacy, 
and was developed as a solution for privacy-preserving data 
analysis. It ensures that the result of an algorithm is not overly 
dependent on any instance, and states that there should be a 
strong probability of producing the same output even if an 
instance was added to or removed from the dataset. Differential 
privacy leapt from research papers to tech news headlines 
when, in the 2016 WWDC keynote, Apple VP of Engineering 
Craig Federighi announced Apple's use of the concept to 
protect user privacy in iOS [39]. According to linknovate.com, 
tech corporations are researching heavily into differential pri- 
vacy with Microsoft, Google and Apple being the top entities 
worldwide leading the innovations and advancements as of 
the date of publishing this work [41]. Google developed new 
algorithmic techniques for deep learning and a refined analysis 
of privacy costs within the framework of differential privacy to 
solve the problem of models exposing private information [40]. 
Google also announced in September 5, 2019 that it is open- 
sourcing an internal tool the company uses to securely draw 
insights from datasets that contain the private and sensitive 
personal information of its users, called differential privacy 
library [42]. 
Although differential privacy is praised for being an in- 
teractive solution that can be adapted to different scenarios 
(data collection, data analysis, machine learning...), it is not 
without its flaws. Kifer and Machanavajjhala [43] provide a 
no-free-lunch theorem to show that it is necessary to make 
assumptions about how the data is generated, to provide 
privacy, which is unlike what differential privacy claims. There 
is also the open problem of setting the optimum value of the 
algorithm's parameters based on  the  scenario at  hand, like 
the parameter ”Epsilon” (E). In addition, the main criticism 
against differential privacy is the fact that it produces noisy 
results, decreasing the accuracy of  the output. This means 
that in order to get decent results from a query, one needs to 
have a reasonably large dataset so that the added noise doesn't 
interfere much with the accuracy of the results. 
 
III.  PRIVACY IN TEXTUAL DATA 
Unstructured data have internal structure but is not struc- 
tured via pre-defined data models or schema. It may be textual 
or  nontextual,  and  human  or  machine-generated. It  doesnt 
fit neatly into the traditional row and column structure of 
relational databases. Examples of unstructured data include: 
emails, videos, audio files, web pages, and social media 
messages. According to mongoDB, in today's world of Big 
Data [7], most of the data that is created is unstructured with 
some estimates of it being more than 95% of all data generated 
[21]. 
Our work focuses on privacy in  textual data. There has 
been lots of work on applying privacy to text, mostly in the 
form of de-identification. Challenges like the n2c2 2006: De- 
identification and Smoking Challenge [8] and the n2c2 2014: 
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De-identification and Heart Disease Risk Factors Challenge performance may not be generalizable to different datasets (i.e.  
[9] (previously housed at i2b2) motivated research in textual 
data de-identification, namely in the field of healthcare. This 
influenced most  work  being  done  on  textual  data  privacy 
to  primarily target  medical  documents, due  to  the  relative 
ease of access to pre-labeled training data; these challenges 
provided pre-labeled data from the domain to facilitate any 
training/testing required by the algorithms in development. 
 
A. Medical Field 
In many countries including the United States, medical pro- 
fessionals are strongly encouraged to adopt electronic health 
records (EHRs) and may face financial penalties if they fail 
to do so [34] [35]. One of the key components of EHRs is 
patient notes. However, before patient notes can be shared with 
medical investigators, some types of information, referred to as 
protected health information (PHI), must be removed in order 
to preserve patient confidentiality. In the United States, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
[36] defines 18 different types of PHI: 
1)  Names 
2)  Dates, except year 
3)  Telephone numbers 
4)  Geographic data 
5)  FAX numbers 
6)  Social Security numbers 
7)  Email addresses 
8)  Medical record numbers 
9)  Account numbers 
10)  Health plan beneficiary numbers 
11)  Certificate/license numbers 
12)  Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers including license 
plates 
13)  Web URLs 
14)  Device identifiers and serial numbers 
15)  Internet protocol addresses 
16)  Full face photos and comparable images 
17)  Biometric identifiers (i.e. retinal scan, fingerprints) 
18)  Any unique identifying number or code 
Performing such a task manually proved to be time-consuming 
and quite expensive. Douglass et al. [37] [38] reported that 
annotators were paid 50 US dollars per hour and read 20 000 
words per hour at best. This motivated research in this domain 
to automate this process. 
Earlier research in the field were oriented towards rule- 
based or pattern-matching solutions, using either complex 
regular  expressions,  dictionaries  or  a  combination  of  both 
[10] [11] [12] [13] [14]. The advantages of rule-based and 
pattern matching de-identification methods is that they require 
little or no annotated training data, and can be easily and 
quickly modified to improve performance by adding rules, 
dictionary terms, or regular expressions. Disadvantages of 
pattern matching de-identification methods are that developers 
have to craft many complex algorithms in order to account for 
different categories of PHI, and the required customization 
to fit a particular dataset. As such, PHI pattern recognition 
data from a different institution or a different type of medical 
report). Another disadvantage is the need for developers to 
be aware of all possible PHI patterns that can occur, such as 
location patterns that use nonstandard abbreviations (e.g., 'Cal' 
for California). 
Later work tended to be mostly based on machine learn- 
ing methods to classify words as PHI or not PHI, and in 
different  classes  of  PHI  in  the  former  case.  The  methods 
used a range of techniques from Support Vector Machines, to 
Conditional Random Fields, Decision Trees, and Maximum 
Entropy  [15]  [16]  [17]  [18].  More  recent  work  is  more 
focused on  utilizing neural  networks and  deep  learning in 
its approach to de-identify patient data. Ji Young Lee et al. 
[19] incorporate human-engineered features as well as features 
derived from electronic health records to a neural-network- 
based de-identification system composed of a Long Short Term 
Memory neural network [20]. 
 
B. Differential Privacy with Textual Data 
 
Benjamin Weggenmann et al. provide an automated text 
anonymization approach that applies differential privacy to the 
vector space model [54]. They obscure term frequencies in 
textual documents' TF-IDF vectors in a differentially private 
manner. Their aim is to prevent a document's author attribution 
through the evaluation of the document's TF-IDF vectors using 
different data-mining techniques. They also demonstrate that 
this approach has a  low impact on accuracy when mining 
these document vectors. Our goal is different from that of 
Weggenmann in that we aim to provide privacy methods to the 
actual text documents, and not their vector representations. 
 
C. Review of Available De-Identification Tools 
 
1) MITdeid:   MITdeid   [23]   is   an   automated   de- 
identification  software   package   that   is   generally   usable 
on most medical records aimed at removing HIPAA PHI, and 
an extended PHI set that includes doctors' names and years of 
dates. The software achieves that by utilizing lexical look-up 
tables, regular expressions, and simple heuristics. This tool 
has a precision of 93.2%, recall of 99.8%, and an F1-score 
of 96.4%. 
2) De-identification of Patient Notes with Recurrent Neural 
Networks  (2016)  -  DeID  [31]:  The  solution  presented  in 
this  paper  uses  RNNs  (Recurrent  Neural  Networks)  with 
LSTM (Long Short-Term Memory) to de-identify medical text 
documents. The system is composed of 3 layers: 
1)  Character-enhanced token embedding layer. 
2)  Label prediction layer 
3)  Label sequence optimization layer 
The solution was evaluated on two datasets: n2b2 2014 [9] and 
MIMIC de-identification datasets (assembled by the writers of 
the system and is twice as large as the n2b2 2014 dataset). It 
has a precision of 97.9%, a recall of 97.8%, and an F1-Score 
of 97.8%. 
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Algorithm Target Data Structure 
 
Approach Scores % 
Precision Recall F1-Score 
K-anonymity 
R-diversity 
 
 
 
t-closeness 
Differential Privacy 
MITdeid 
 
DeID 
 
NLM-Scrubber 
 
 
CliniDeID 
Structured 
Structured 
 
 
 
Structured 
Structured 
Textual 
 
Textual 
 
Textual 
 
 
Textual 
generalization/suppression of quazi-identifiers 
adds on k-anonymity by making the sensitive at- 
tributes in every equivalence class of the dataset 
records contain a minimum of R properly depicted 
values 
adds on R-diversity by decreasing the granularity of 
the interpreted data 
adding noise to ensure that the result of an algorithm 
is not overly dependent on any single instance 
utilizes lexical look-up tables, regular expressions 
and   simple   heuristics   to   remove   HIPAA   PHI 
frommedical records 
uses RNNs with LSTM to remove HIPAA PHI from 
medical records 
uses a combination of regular expressions and 
pattern-matching to remove 12 personal identifier 
categories in patient medical notes 
uses twelve de-identification models that use deep 
learning, shallow learning,or rule-based approaches 
to remove HIPAA PHI 
- 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
93.2 
 
 
97.9 
 
93.2 
 
 
97 
- 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
99.8 
 
 
97.8 
 
99.8 
 
 
94.4 
- 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
96.4 
 
 
97.8 
 
96.4 
 
 
95.7 
 
TABLE IV 
CO M PA R I S I O N O F P R I VAC Y AL G O R I T H M S 
 
 
 
3) NLM-Scrubber:  NLM-Scrubber [32] is advertised as a 
HIPAA compliant, clinical text de-identification tool designed 
and developed at the National Library of Medicine. It looks 
for 12 personal identifier categories in patient medical notes. 
It uses a combination of regular expressions and pattern- 
matching to locate and remove identifiers from documents. 
Testing on some sample text reveals that it is not difficult 
to manipulate with this tool. For example, a name that isn't 
capitalized is not detected as a name. Also, the age (65) in a 
sentence like: Dave is a 65 year old man is not detected as 
an age. This tool offers a precision of 93.2%, recall of 99.8%, 
and an F1-score of 96.4%. 
4) CliniDeID:  Is a  tool for de-identifying clinical notes 
according to the HIPAA Safe Harbor method. Owned by the 
company ClinAcuity and based on the work done by Youngjun 
Kim et al. [33], it finds identifiers and tags or replaces them 
with surrogates for anonymity. The tool includes twelve de- 
identification models that use deep learning, shallow learning, 
or rule-based approaches. This tool has a precision of 97%, 
recall of 94.4% and an F1-score of 95.7%. 
Table III-A compares all the tools and algorithms mentioned 
in this section so far. 
5) Named Entity Recognition Tools: Due to the strong 
correlation between Text de-identification and Named Entity 
Recognition (NER), here we shall discuss the tools we found 
that handle text analysis and (NER). 
1)  Stanford CoreNLP Tool (2014) [55]: Is an NLP tool 
created  by  Stanford  university,  initially  developed  in 
2006, further work led to the system being released as 
free open source software in 2010. The tool supports, to 
varying degrees, the languages Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French and German. In our experimentation, the tool 
was quite successful at part-of-speech tagging, but had 
varying inaccuracies when it came to NER, especially 
with identifying person names. 
2)  NeuroNER [56]:  is  a  program that  performs named- 
entity recognition (NER), used by the Stanford CoreNLP 
tool. It's composed of a 3-layer recurrent neural network 
with LSTM. The tool was good at detecting names, 
unless they were lower-cased. It was also good at 
detecting locations, but it doesnt detect any date or age. 
3) Gate [57]: Gate offers text analysis services (part-of- 
speech, NER, ), but it uses a static approach. Its not so 
good at detecting named entities, and its quite easy to 
trick it by changing the structure of the sentence. 
4)  IBMs Watson, Natural Language Understanding [58]: Is 
a collection of APIs that offer text analysis tools using 
Natural Language Processing. Watson's performance in 
NER was inconclusive for us; on one side, it offers the 
most complex analysis where it doesn't only name the 
entities with decent granularity (an address is divided 
into ”location” and ”facility”), but can also detect the 
tonality of the speech. On the other hand, it was still 
not so difficult to mislead. It doesn't always detect dates, 
and still doesn't detect person names if they are not 
capitalized. 
 
D. Discussion 
The application of differential privacy to textual data is 
mostly possible by using the word vectorization of key terms 
chosen from  the  text,  then  applying differential privacy to 
these vectors. This is useful for running privacy-preserving 
statistical analysis on these terms, or to prevent a document's 
author attribution [54]. However, it falls short when it comes 
to  preserving  the  structure  of  the  text,  since  it  picks  out 
only specific terms discarding the rest of the text. Our aim 
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Fig.  1.    M ODS  Model  Construction  Process  for  a  Given 
Domain D. 
Fig.  2.    M ODI    Model  Construction  Process  for  a  Given 
Domain D. 
 
 
is not to choose specific keywords from a given text to run 
a specific analysis, rather we want to conserve most of the 
text, removing/obscuring only what's necessary to preserve the 
privacy of any individuals present in it while preserving most 
of the text's utility. 
Dictionary based and pattern-matching based approaches 
to provide privacy in text, like MITdeid and NLM-Scrubber, 
aren't much complex to implement, and require little to no 
annotated training data. But that comes on the expense of 
being static, where every target term to be captured has to be 
manually transcribed through complex regular expressions. In 
addition, solutions using these approaches can't be generalized 
to handle different datasets; they're only made to handle a 
target dataset, or a category of datasets. 
Neural-network based approaches like DeID and Clin- 
iDeID are the ones with the most promise in terms of accuracy, 
adaptability, and generalizability. Once a neural network model 
is created and trained to capture specific terms in a piece of 
text, it is then able to capture other terms that are symantically 
equivalent, which are learned from the context of the text. This 
is crucial in the field of text analysis since it is very difficult 
to predict every possible structure of a sentence in a given 
language, or every possible use of a term or word. The problem 
with available solutions is that they are fixated on the field of 
medicine and capturing PHIs, and don't take infto account texts 
about other domians like finance or trading. Besides, these 
solutions treat all identifiers equally, although one identifier 
(like names) can have higher priority to be removed than others 
(like age) since it can identify an individual more easily. 
 
IV.  OUR APPROACH 
 
In our work, we are concentrating on text, therefore all 
operations are done on textual documents, each of which 
contains natural language text. We assume that a document 
is associated with a single natural person and, without loss of 
generality, we assume that multiple documents may refer to a 
single natural person. 
In order to cause a privacy problem, the document should 
be identifiable (containing personal identifiers), and should 
contain private information. If  any  of  these conditions are 
not satisfied, then the document will not cause privacy leaks. 
Therefore, the degree of privacy risks associated with a textual 
document are a combination of the present identifying and 
private information present in it. 
Due to the nature of text documents having different pri- 
orities to what is private and what is sensitive based on the 
domain that said documents belong to (finance, healthcare...), 
it is important to take into account the differences of each 
term's ”criticality” in a given document based on what domain 
said document belongs to. In our work, we refer to words in 
documents as ”terms”, but not all words, rather ones that are 
not stop words. 
The main objective of our work is of two folds: 
1)  Devise a framework to measure the degree of identifia- 
bilty and sensitivity of entities in a given text domain. 
Then, using these measures, construct a module to be 
used to assess the privacy risks of a text document 
belonging to said domain, if the text was to be published, 
based on the sensitive information and the personal iden- 
tifiers present in this document. The provided measures 
take into consideration the semantics of the documents 
as the main utility guarantee. 
2)  Based on the devised framework, provide a set of tools 
and algorithms for privacy preserving textual data man- 
agement including textual data publishing and mining. 
 
A. Term Attribution 
We associate three attributes to each term in a given text 
document. 
1)  identifiability: the degree to which a term can identify 
a real person. For example, a person's name has a high 
level of identifiability, but his country of residence might 
have a lower level of that (there are more people living in 
the United Kingdom than there are people called Jason). 
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by finding terms in the vendor data that is similar in context to TABLE V  
S A M P L E O F T H E 3 M E T R I C S F O R G I V E N T E R M S 
 
Model 
Terms Identifiability Privacy   Sensitiv- 
ity 
Semantic 
Value 
age 
sex 
disease 
... 
0.3 
0.4 
0.2 
... 
0.2 
0.3 
0.7 
... 
0.2 
0.3 
0.6 
... 
 
 
 
2)  Privacy  Sensitivity:  is  this  term  a  sensitive  piece  of 
information? Each domain has its own set of sensitive 
keywords, so this is domain-specific. A term such as 
location could be both privacy-sensitive and identifying 
a real person. 
3)  Semantic value: how much information does this term 
convey with respect to the general context of the doc- 
ument. Semantic value should be assessed with respect 
to the application. For example, in case of the domain 
of social studies, the opinion-baring terms have more 
semantic value, while in a health application this may 
be different. 
For each term in a given document, each of these attributes 
is marked with a numerical value (a metric) reflecting the 
significance of the term with respect to the attribute. Each of 
the three metrics can be considered as a normalized weight, 
where a higher value indicates that the term is more significant. 
Identifyability metric. For each term, this value is calcu- 
lated by checking the term's uniqueness; for example, given 2 
names (Bob and Jason), if the name Bob appears more often 
than Jason, then Bob has a lower identifyability metric than 
Jason,since it is more unique. 
Sensitivity metric. For each term, this value is calculated 
based on the work done by Sa´nchez et al. [45], where by using 
the semantics of the text, we can assess the degree of sensi- 
tiveness of terms according to the amount of information they 
provide. Then, this assessment is represented as a normalized 
numerical value. 
Semantic  value  metric.  Using  sentiment  analysis,  the 
sentiment of sentences in the text is studied to determine the 
significance of each term to the semantic structure of their 
respective sentence. The terms that each sentence is centered 
around are considered as terms of semantic significance for 
the text. This significance is then represented as a normalized 
numerical value. 
A sample table is provided in Table V. 
 
B. Adaptability 
Our solution contains data-driven models adaptable to dif- 
ferent data domains, with the ability to customize these models 
further through training on vendor-specific data. This concept 
is based on word vectorization, where dictionaries of vendor- 
specific terms  relating  to  identifiability and  sensitivity  are 
first constructed, then expanded upon using domain-specific 
knowledge-base to form a model, which is adapted to the 
contexts used in vendor use cases. The model is constructed 
the terms present in the original dictionaries. Figures 1 and 2 
represent the construction process of the model for sensitivity 
(M ODS ) from the dictionary for sensitive terms (SEEDS ) 
and the model for identifiability (M ODI ) from the dictionary 
for identifiable terms (SEEDI ) respectively. 
 
C. Restriction Flexibility 
For every given data domain exists a pre-calculated 
criticality  threshold. This  threshold is  evaluated through 
the analysis of domain-specific datasets, and is used as an 
anchor point for the data holder to fine-tune the level of 
anonymity  that  is  to  be  applied  to  the  text  in  a  manner 
that suits their privacy standards. This is important because 
there is a compromise that must be met between privacy and 
utility; the more strict the privacy rules being applied are, the 
less utility the document has (since we are removing data 
from  the  document). Our  solution  makes  it  easy  to  strike 
the required balance, as privacy risks are quantified, allowing 
data holders to alter solution parameters to fulfill their privacy 
requirements. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Data storage is now mostly moving towards unstructured 
data, and the use of textual data has become an inseparable 
part of our daily lives. We only continue to share more of 
our personal info through online services and social media. In 
this paper, we've introduced a new concept for a data-oriented 
solution that provides measures for a given text document to 
assess the privacy-leak potential of said document, as well as 
measure its semantic utility. We believe that this work can 
pave the way for a new data-driven orientation in the privacy- 
research field. 
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